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THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY DURING BULGARIA’S POST-1989 
“TRANSITION” 




The following is a slightly revised selection from chapter 4 of Veronika Stoyanova’s recent 
book Ideology and Social Protests in Eastern Europe: Beyond the Transition’s Liberal 
Consensus (London: Routledge, 2018). Stoyanova traces discursive developments during the 
final years of Communist Party rule in Bulgaria and the radical transformations that 
followed, when the concept of civil society played a central role in emerging justifications of 
democracy, market reforms, and a certain kind of anti-populist elitism.  
 
“The Great Time of the Intelligentsia”: Intellectuals Leading “Civil Society” before 
1989 
[…] Civil society first appeared in the discourses of the “revisionists” within the Communist 
Party around 1987–1988 in the context of talks about “preustroistvo” (the Bulgarian version 
of the Soviet “perestroika”). Thus, it emerged as part of the wider discourse of “glasnost” and 
“preustroistvo” that was dominant at the time, and particularly key for this early stage of the 
development of the civil society discourse was the concept of glasnost. Behind it we find the 
newly emerging possibility for the intelligentsia to speak without the party censorship which 
had been previously imposed. A basic characteristic of the perestroika ideology was that 
Soviet countries were now entering a new era, whereby not the party but the intelligentsia 
would be those “who carry the truth and values,” and whereby the intelligentsia would be the 
principle leading agent of social changes.1 
A major communicative event2 that was both constitutive of and constituted by the changing 
discursive political-social practices of the time of preustroistvo, and which was later 
celebrated as marking the first openly voiced dissident claims, is the text “The Great Time of 
the Intelligentsia” (from now on, GTI), written by the dissident-philosopher Zhelyu Zhelev 
and published in Narodna Kultura (People’s culture) in July 1988. [...] Zhelev gained his 
dissident label when in the early 1980s he wrote Fascism – a book which purported to expose 
the crimes of Fascism but was rather intended as, and read as, an indictment of Communism 
– for which he was expelled from the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) and spent time in 
prison.3 The term “dissident” was, by the 1980s, commonly used in the West to refer mostly 
                                                          
1 For an analysis of the discourse regarding the preustroistvo ideology in Bulgaria, see Vassil Prodanov, 
“Inteligentsiata i ideologicheskiyat diskurs na transformaciyata ot darzhaven sotsializum kum periferen i 
oligarhichen kapitalizum” [The intelligentsia and the ideological discourse of the transformation from state 
socialism to periphery and oligarchic capitalism], in Izsledvania po istoria na sotsializma v Bulgariya: prehodut, 
ed. E. Kandilarov (Sofia: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Centre for Historical and Political Research, 2011), pp. 
485–522. 
2 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (London: Routledge, 2003). 
3 During the regime, expulsion from the party constituted not simply a sanction, but rather a form of repression 
that ejected that personality out of the public sphere and deprived them of the opportunity to communicate with 
the public. At the same time, however, an intellectual’s expulsion from the party and criminalisation of their 
to intellectuals’ positions in the context of a lack of freedom – they were very often 
designated as “anti-communist.” Yet, in the context of the more repressive regime in Bulgaria 
(relative to those in Central and Eastern Europe, hereafter CEE), since the mid-1950s the 
“dissidents” were mostly intellectuals (whether members of the BKP or not) who did not 
verbally oppose the communist ideology but rather expressed “corrective” criticism whenever 
there was a serious mismatch between proclaimed values and their practical realisation.4 In 
this context, Zhelev’s (and later pre-1989 dissident-intellectuals’) texts appear as 
“revisionist” rather than oppositional (and many of the intellectuals were genuine 
“revisionists” rather than covert “anti-communists”5). Similarly, concepts such as 
“democracy” and “civil society” were at the time positioned within, rather than outside of, the 
socialist project – hence they talked of “socialist democracy” and “socialist civil society.” 
Inasmuch then as these concepts were used before 1989, they were offered as a means to 
achieving “socialism with a human face,” and nobody yet questioned the latter’s feasibility, 
as evidenced by many of the memoirs which appeared throughout the 1990s.6 In contrast, 
such a revisionist conception of dissidence – one that rested on the conviction that the system 
could be “humanized and democratized […] from within”7 – animated the political context of 
Central Europe only until the brutality of the suppression of the Hungarian and Polish 
uprisings of 1956 and of the Czechoslovakian reforms in 1968.8  
Importantly, dissidents in Bulgaria were almost always intellectuals – part of the so-called 
“intelligentsia.” The intelligentsia assumed an almost autonomous class consciousness during 
the communist regime;9 it was composed of authoritative writers, artists, actors, scientists, 
and others, whose popularity was publicly sanctioned, including through the mechanisms of 
power. During the regime, most of them were an important conduit for socialist propaganda 
(as in Gramsci’s conception of “organic intellectuals“), but many of them became public 
speakers (and opinion makers) whose opinions were recognised as more authentic than those 
of official (party) power-holders.10 Their main social function was to be society’s moral and 
cultural vanguard (much like Antonio Gramsci’s11 “moral leadership”), which entailed a 
catalyst role in society’s progress. In the last days of the regime, they acted both as a group 
exerting political pressure and as experts influencing political decision-making.12 It is also 
worth noting that although the term itself is a Russian artefact (from Tsarist Russia), the 
genesis of the Bulgarian social group which was referred to as “intelligentsia” needs to be 
                                                          
work used to increase their popularity and informally legitimise their public role. Nataliya Hristova, “Mitut za 
vseobshtiat konformizym. Bulgarskite intelektualci prez vtorata polovina na XX vek” [The myth of wide 
conformity: The Bulgarian intellectuals in the second half of 20th century], Monde diplomatique (Bulgarian 
edition), February 2007. 
4 Naraliya Hristova, Spetsifika na Bulgarskoto ‘disidentstvo’. Vlast i intelligentsia 1956–1989 [The specifics of 
the Bulgarian “dissidence”: power and intelligentsia 1956–1989] (Sofia: Letera, 2005); Hristova, “Mitut za 
vseobshtiat konformizym.” 
5 Ibid. 
6 For an analysis of these memoirs see Evgeniya Kalinova and Iskra Baeva, Sotsializmut v ogledaloto na 
prehoda [Socialism in the mirror of the transition] (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2011), especially pp. 419–420. 
7 Adam Michnik, Letters from Prison and Other Essays (London: University of California Press, 1985), p. 135. 
8 Leszek Kołakowski, “A Pleading for Revolution: A rejoinder to Z. Bauman,” European Journal of 
Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie 12 (1971), no. 1, pp. 52–60. 
9 See Hristova, Spetsifika na bulgarskoto ’disidentstvo.’ 
10 Ibid. 
11 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). 
12 Hristova, “Mitut za vseobshtiat konformizym.“ 
traced specifically to the post-independence period of Bulgaria (after 1878), and particularly 
in Western-, as well as Eastern- (Moscow) educated emigrees’ attempts to become agents of 
cultural change and to bridge an imagined gap between what they saw as local, traditional, 
and “backward” habits on the one hand, and Western Europe on the other – that is, attempting 
to impose a new civilizational model.13 In other words, this social group conceived of their 
role as a messianic duty to “enlighten the masses”14 in line with Western cultural models.15 
The significance of such a conception, adopted by Bulgarian intellectuals, will transpire 
particularly strongly in the early years of the post-socialist transformation. 
[...]  
This in essence utopian vision of a new – civil – society partly accommodated the possibility 
for the reproduction of top-down power imbalances, which had demobilising effects for the 
popular classes – since they were Not Yet civil, they had to let themselves be led by the 
intelligentsia. Thus, the potentially powerful (mobilising) concept of an inclusionary civil 
society was unwittingly transformed into an insipid ideological construct hardly related to a 
collective mobilisational and participatory democratic agenda. In practice, then, Bulgarian 
dissident-intellectuals’ oppositional discourses could be seen as conducive to what Gramsci16 
called a “passive revolution” only17 – an elite-led endeavour which failed to engage the 
popular classes. 
 
Civil Society Divided: The 1990 Utopian “City of Truth,” “Energetic Minorities” vs. 
“Docile Majorities” 
The discourse of preustroistvo, within which Zhelev’s and other dissident-intellectuals’ texts 
before 1989 were embedded, generated anticipations for revolutionary change; and apart 
from a new – more significant – role for the intelligentsia (as the “authentic carriers of values 
and truths”), the concept of glasnost also articulated hopes that in this way people’s eyes will 
be opened for all the truths that were allegedly previously hidden from them.18 Soon after the 
change of leadership on November 10, the discourse of preustroistvo, and with it the socialist 
frame of civil society, disappeared, but important conceptual meanings associated with it 
persisted and even intensified – for example, “revolutionary” in relation to the changes taking 
place,19 as well as glasnost itself, which continued to be used for some time (particularly in 
slogans of the protests of 1989–1991). One of the most significant discursive events which 
contributed to the constitution and construal of “civil society” in the immediate period after 
November 1989 was the one arising out of the civil disobedience acts in the summer of 1990 
in response to the (disappointing for the anti-communist opposition) results of the first 
democratic elections. In what follows, I discuss the discourses which appeared and circulated 
                                                          
13 Hristova, Spetsifika na bulgarskoto ‘disidentstvo.’ 
14 Boyan Penev, “Nashata Inteligentsiya” [Our intelligentsia] Zlatorog 5 (1924), no. 1, pp. 3-20. 
15 This idea of “catching up” with the West is to a different extent present in the entire CEE region. See, for 
example, Tomasz Zarycki, Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe (Oxon: Routledge, 2014). 
16 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 106. 
17 Although many later observers would conceptualise the entire postcommunist bloc’s changes as a “passive 
revolution” (e.g., Ash 1999; Shields 2006), the Bulgarian changes in 1989 might be considered a particularly 
striking case. 
18 Prodanov, “Inteligentsiata i ideologicheskiyat diskurs.” 
19 The “revolutionary” discourse, however, slowly dissolved in the following years. The events of 1989 were 
later remembered as “the change,” “the changes,” or “the big changes” in Bulgaria. 
at the time; the articulation, disarticulation, and re-articulation of political identities and 
relationships; and the consequences of these shifts for the (re-)conceptualisation of the idea of 
“civil society.” 
Since the executive power in Bulgaria after the first democratic elections stayed in the hands 
of the “reformers” from the ex-Communist Party (who carried out the change of leadership 
on November 10, 1989), with the opposition failing to secure a strong position within the new 
political configuration through the ballot box, the opposition and their supporters attempted 
instead to push “the changes” through “street pressure”20 – a series of protest and civil 
disobedience acts in 1990 (occupations of public spaces, road blockades, hunger strikes, 
threats to self-immolate, demonstrations, and so on). The acts were initiated by students who 
occupied Sofia University and were supported by intellectuals – writers, artists, scientists, 
film directors, etc., who were later themselves followed by many ordinary “free citizens” (a 
key discursive frame). Since in essence these were attempts for a political change of power 
outside of parliamentary democracy’s procedures (attempts to overthrow the results of the 
first elections), they needed to be publicly legitimated. The key legitimating strategy utilised 
precisely the idea of civil society. 
One of the central elements of these civil disobedience acts can be seen in the “City of Truth” 
occupation – the tent city, and the discourses that constituted and construed it, which 
appeared in central Sofia in the summer of 1990. Philip Dimitrov – then vice-chair of the 
opposition party United Democratic Forces (and later prime minister)21 – narrated the event 
“as a natural reaction to the tearful results of the [first] elections” and “a spontaneous 
expression of the anger of the people.” Particularly important, and regularly utilised 
elsewhere, are the use of the adjectives “spontaneous” and “natural” to describe these and 
later protest events initiated by the liberal opposition. The latter adjective is also part of a new 
narrative around a “natural development” which emerged at the time: Bulgaria had been 
“diverted away” from a natural course of development that had created an “artificial society,” 
and it was now necessary to get back on the right track. In this “natural development,” it was 
claimed that some groups knew where history was heading and what the “right future” was 
(they carried progress); whereas others were bound to stay in the past. In a speech in 1990 
Zhelyu Zhelev proclaimed that “the time is ours” and “the cycle of history spins inevitably to 
the full victory of democracy,” implicitly drawing on similar words pronounced by Georgi 
Dimitrov, but this time it was not “communism” that would win, but “democracy.”22 As was 
shown earlier, this also implied that the place of the working class as the class-agent leading 
the changes would be now taken by the intelligentsia. 
The other commonly used descriptive concept, that of “spontaneity,” was also part of a new 
discourse around authenticity, which marked the beginning of a typical fundamentalist 
conflict – between “authentic” (or “real”) and “inauthentic” (“parochial”) – to distinguish 
between an act of non-party organised protest (for which the term “civic” was used) as 
opposed to one inspired and organised by parochial (party) interests (which was discursively 
linked to the “party-political” rather than the civic). Of course, this discourse, for its part, is 
situated within the wider trend of depoliticization characteristic of the entire post-socialist 
                                                          
20 Kalinova and Baeva, Sotsializmut v ogledaloto na prehoda. 
21 Cited by Mitko Rupov, “Gradut na Istinata” [The City of Truth], YouTube Video, 2011 (online at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnKDlQg8kk4&t=368s [accessed Sept. 12, 2019]). 
22 Cited by Prodanov, “Inteligentsiata i ideologicheskiyat diskurs,” p. 509. 
region, and to some extent of global such processes.23 The depoliticization trends of the post–
Cold War period are part of the global hegemonic (neo)liberal consensus. At this early stage 
of the development of the civil society discourse in Bulgaria and in CEE generally, however, 
it is difficult to talk of depoliticization. Instead, it is more appropriate to talk of 
“decommunisation.” Thus, the common rhetorical elevation of civic values and of “truth” and 
“authenticity” above the world of politics is mostly situated within the anti-regime 
mobilizational discursive frame established by Central European dissidents over the 
preceding years.24 
The common denominator of these rhetorical tropes was “truth.” For instance, in the “City of 
Truth,” a central placard read: “When even the facts are silent, the communists continue to 
lie.”25 References to “truth,” which exploited authentic human desires, were appropriated for 
the purposes of the project of decommunisation which was being inaugurated in these 
demonstrations. Only from the position of a “civil” as opposed to a “politicised” (which 
equalled communist and indoctrinated) society could protesters claim the genuine capacity to 
see things as they are and to articulate claims to truth. Again, the centrality of the notion of 
“truth” here is closely linked to Central European dissidents’ conceptualisation of political 
opposition as “life in truth,”26 which denotes the practice of resistance against the regime’s 
“panorama of lies.”27 
Such claims to “truth” and “authenticity” (and the discourses they were situated in) would 
continue to be utilised by the liberal democratic activists and political actors for the entire 
duration of the transition. These essentially formed part of the binary construction which 
characterised the period’s political confrontation in CEE: (communist) control and 
administration versus (civic) spontaneity, and the (communist) artificial and inauthentic life 
versus the natural and true life of the (liberal and “civil”) society. More generally, during this 
period we can talk of a new style of communication settling in the public sphere – that of 
bitter confrontation, characterised by stigmatisation, rejection, and demonization of 
everything related to the old system, marking a general polarisation and dichotomisation of 
thinking. The old ideological discourse was discredited; it was now perceived to belong to the 
past. For example, the new liberal worldview did not need the concept of narod (people) as a 
collective subject and attempted to substitute it with “citizen.” This, however, did not prove 
an enduring discursive change because the concept of narod fully re-emerged in the public 
sphere when around 2001 a wave of “populist” rhetoric embraced it once again. Its 
revitalisation, however, transpired as a counter-hegemonic strategy, forging a conflict 
between the liberal concept of citizens and the communitarian narod. The significance of this 
rift would transpire in Bulgaria on many occasions during the transition and would be 
                                                          
23 For a discussion of the concept of “fake” civil society in Hungary see, for example, Márton Gerő and Ákos 
Kopper, “Fake and Dishonest: Pathologies of Differentiation of the Civil and the Political Sphere in Hungary,” 
Journal of Civil Society 9 (2013), no. 4, pp. 361–374.  
24 See, for example, Václav Havel’s “Anti-political Politics” and George Konrad’s Antipolitics: Václav Havel, 
“Anti-political Politics,” trans. Erazim Kohák, in Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives, ed. 
John Keane (London: Verso Books, 1988); George Konrad, Antipolitics (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1984). 
25 In Rupov, “Gradut na Istinata.”  
26 See Václav Havel, “The power of the powerless,” trans. Paul Wilson, in The Power of the Powerless: Citizens 
against the State in Central-Eastern Europe, ed. John Keane (London: Hutchinson, 1985), pp.23-95. 
27 Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” p. 142. 
particularly central to the 2013 protests’ contestations,28 but its first markers can be found in 
the “City of Truth” discursive event. 
The adjectives “spontaneous” and “natural,” coupled with the numerous denotations to 
“truth” (including the name – “City of Truth”) essentially now articulated a “civil society” 
frame of collective mobilisation29 against the state. It captured the opposition’s general 
euphoric, optimistic, celebratory consciousness, existing in a “carnivalesque delirium,”30 
utopianly expecting that after the removal of obstacles coming from the state – the 
nomenclature, or the BKP – the “road to Europe” would be cleared, Bulgaria would reach the 
consumerist bliss of Western Europe, and “democracy” would give the intelligentsia the 
opportunity to take the more significant place that it saw itself as deserving without 
limitations imposed by the political sphere.31 
Apart from a euphoric showdown between a celebratory “civil society” and a discredited 
state, there appeared other very important fault lines. The subjectivities that the 1990 “civil 
society” frame of collective mobilisation interpellated32 included the “free” and “honest” 
citizens (these two adjectives appeared numerous times in the speeches given at the first 
demonstrations after November 10) who were now called upon to challenge the Communist 
Party nomenclature which “did not want to go away.” At the same time, however, the “free” 
and “honest” citizens who joined the protests, demonstrations, occupations, and the City of 
Truth were not only positioned against “the state,” but also pitted against what were 
increasingly framed as the “silent,” “docile,” and “passive” majority of Bulgarian citizens, 
who resided predominantly in rural areas (and often voted for the Bulgarian Socialist Party to 
stay in power). It did not help that the BSP organised a “counter-demonstration” calling for 
their supporters – and organising their transport to the capital – to counteract the opposition 
protests’ challenge of the ex-communists’ democratic legitimacy. The dominant 
interpretation thus posited not only a clash between “civil society” and the state, but also a 
clash between “civil society” (active, free and authentic) and “uncivil (passive, unfree and 
false) society.” Observers commonly referred to the groups of protesters collectively as an 
“energetic minority”33 of “free citizens,” thus equating civil society to an enlightened and 
active minority pitted against a docile and passive majority. Thus, the elitist seeds of the 
Bulgarian protest discourses which, we shall later see, fully re-emerged in 2013, were sown 
back in 1990. (Although varying in degree, a similar phenomenon was observable in post-
socialist Central Europe as well).34  
What is more, key self-referential concepts, utilised by the participants themselves, were the 
words “grazhdanski” (“civic”) and “grazhdani” (“citizens”), both of which are derivative of 
                                                          
28 See Veronika Stoyanova, Ideology and Social Protests in Eastern Europe: Beyond the Transition's Liberal 
Consensus (Oxon: Routledge, 2018) [from which the present text is taken], particularly chapters 6 and 7, which 
focus on protest events which took place in Bulgaria in 2013.  
29 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), pp. 611–639, here pp. 625-626. 
30 Prodanov, “Inteligentsiata i ideologicheskiyat diskurs,” p. 508. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Louis Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. G. Lock (London: New Left Books, 1976). 
33 Petya Kabakchieva, Grazhdanskoto obshtestvo sreshtu durzhavata [Civil society against the state] (Sofia: Lik, 
2001). 
34 Tessa Brannan, “From Antipolitics to Anti-politics: What Became of East European Civil Society” 
(Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, Working Paper No. 03–41, 
2003) (online at http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP41.pdf [accessed July 25, 2019]). 
the word “grad” (“city”). For example, one of the central placards of the City of Truth 
encampment read: “Grazhdanska initsiativa v imeto na istinata” (“Civic initiative in the name 
of truth”).35 The semantic link between the terms “civil society,” “civic,” and “city” in the 
local context is particularly important for understanding both the local conceptualisation of 
the idea of civil society and the latter’s constitution and construal as part of the democratic 
transformation’s socio-political developments. So I will focus on it next. 
The term “civil society” in Bulgarian reads “grazhdansko obshtestvo” – translated as “civic 
(or “citizens’”) society,” where “citizen” could relate both to the subject of a state and to the 
inhabitant of a city. What is significant here are the local cultural connotations of the words 
“civic,” “citizen,” and “city.” These are rooted in the historical development not only of a 
cultural schism, but also a hostile relationship between the “city” and the “village” in 
Bulgaria and in Eastern Europe more generally. The two are identified as carriers of 
particular socio-cultural characteristics, which are subsequently played out in the 
conceptualisation of “civil society.” The former is taken to epitomise a progressive, modern, 
liberal, pluralist, and individualist West; the latter embodies a traditional, retrograde, 
patriarchal, conservative, and collectivist East. According to Roth,36 though the hostile 
relationship between the two can be traced back to the Ottoman period, it was exacerbated by 
the communist regime’s modernisation and urbanisation policies, which were perceived by 
urban dwellers as annihilating the city’s (civic, modern, bourgeois) cultural universe and as a 
“re-traditionalisation”37 of a supposedly established (pre-1944) urban bourgeois culture. On 
encountering this (latent) cultural conflict between the “city” and the “village,” the 1989 idea 
of civil society was re-articulated precisely along these fault lines. Thus, in some 
intellectuals’ interpretations of the changes and of civil society, we read: 
[I]t is namely the city that represents the space of the public structures which counter 
the tribal and communitarian structures; this is where the net of interdependencies, 
which the citizen should accept, is created. This civil society in Bulgaria is currently 
under construction. We need to first rediscover the forgotten and lost city spaces, to 
construct the system we want to abide by and the structures in which we want to 
incorporate our civic responsibilities.38 
[B]ut how do you make citizens out of this [village] world; how do you make civil 
society out of this unmodernised mass of people – nobody knows. Today we are some 
very frightened, confused, quite demoralised and pessimistic people, who continue to 
survive, who continue to behave like crushed villagers rather than like citizens. And 
they hate, and [they] are envious.39 
                                                          
35 Placard as seen on recordings of the protests, uploaded by Rupov (Rupov, “Gradut na Istinata”). 
36 Klaus Roth, “Mezhdu modernizatsiya i tranditsionalizum. Vsekidnevnata kultura na seloto v Iugoiztochna 
Evropa” [Between modernization and traditionalism: Everyday culture in the Southeast European village], 
Bulgarski Folklor 1997, no. 3/4, pp. 26–38. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Penka Angelova, “Shengen i bulgarskoto grazhdansko obshtestvo” [Schengen and Bulgarian civil society] 
Kapital, August 1, 1998 (online at 
https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/obshtestvo/1998/08/01/245901_shengen_i_bulgarskoto_grajdansk
o_obshtestvo/ [accessed Sept. 12, 2019]).   
39 Haralan Aleksandrov, “Patriarhut, pokolenieto “nie’ i iuzarite” [The patriarch, the “we” generation, and the 
users], Kapital, September 1, 2001 (online at 
https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2001/09/01/210748_patriarhatut_pokolenieto_nie_i_juzur
ite/ [accessed: Sept. 12, 2019]). 
The concept of “civil society” was further pitted against the concept of narod. The latter, in 
the discourse of civil society’s advocates, typically denotes the majority of the people, those 
who are not elite, and also degradingly as those who are unenlightened, retrograde, and who 
perceive themselves as “subjects” of the state rather than citizens with “rights.” The 
collective concept of narod was/is thus often used in intellectuals’ narratives degradingly as 
synonymous to the collective image of the “villager” archetype. This bifurcating narrative 
forms the backbone of the descriptive grand-narrative of the absent or weak civil society that, 
according to this discourse, can be “found” or “strengthened” only within the city space: 
[T]he democratic shift in 1989 marked a return to the urban culture (almost magically 
the figure of the village poet disappeared from literature and public life). With the mass 
demonstrations which accompanied the changes, a kind of rediscovery of the urban 
space – pluralist and dialogical – occurred … However this shift occurred mostly in the 
limited intellectual circles. We have every reason to believe that the political 
immaturity, which our society showed in the first years of the transition, is a 
manifestation of the continuing tradition that has not been overcome.40 
In this way, the early 1990s articulated two different, but linked, conceptualisations of the 
civil society idea: one prescriptive (related to a normative vision) and one empirical 
(descriptive). The normative, idealised conceptualisation was initiated by the revisionist 
socialist discourse and the dissident-intellectuals and was further taken up by politicians, 
journalists, academics, and ordinary people. It envisaged a new, modern, civilised society, or, 
in Bernik’s41 words: an ideology of radical social utopianism that generates myths about 
democracy. The second, empirical, conception – grounded in the cultural friction between the 
city and the village – distinguished (and set against each other) an active (energetic) “civil” 
society, and a passive “uncivil” mass society. What is more, such a bifurcated 
conceptualisation served as an interpretative frame, or an analytic tool, which legitimised an 
interpretative scheme that was employed by intellectuals and which saw social conflict not in 
terms of practically arising class antagonisms, but rather in terms of a comparison to a 
utopian imaginary of an ideal, perfect society. This, on its part, served to cover up and mask 
newly arising (economic) inequalities and issues of power and domination. Instead of 
viewing the new social antagonisms as arising from the sharp fall in living standards and 
widening inequalities that were rooted in economic decay during the transition, intellectuals, 
journalists, and politicians made use of the idea of civil society to legitimise the application 
of a cultural interpretative scheme – that is, that people went into poverty because they were 
passive, not because the neoliberalisation of post-socialist societies entailed the 
impoverishment of significant sections of the population. 
Overall then, in the early stage of the transformation, the concept of civil society carried the 
notions of truth, morality, civilisation, and emancipation, which became integral to the 
popular understanding of the term, explaining its general appeal and motivational capacity. 
The constituting characteristics of “civil society” were “spontaneity” and “authenticity.” It 
                                                          
40 Ivaylo Znepolski, “Selska kultura i grazhdansko obshtestvo” [Rural culture and civil society], Kapital, 
January 9, 1999 (online at 
https://www.capital.bg/vestnikut/svobodno_vreme/1999/01/09/248308_selska_kultura_i_grajdansko_obshtestvo
/ [accessed Sept. 12, 2019]). 
41 Ivan Bernik, “From Imagined to Actually Existing Democracy: Intellectuals in Slovenia,” in Intellectuals and 
Politics in Central Europe, ed. András Bozóki (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), pp. 101–
118. 
carried the utopian message of the determination of the “free people,” who had been 
previously excluded from the political arena, to assert their agency and their capability to 
make autonomous decisions. At this early stage, the Western European focus on 
organisational aspects (in the Tocquevillian sense) of the functioning of civil society is not 
present in Bulgaria; and by the summer of 1990 the concept had acquired its constitutive 
“other(s).” First, this was in the figure of the state (which was still in the hands of the 
“communists” and thence was seen as “blocking” civil society’s emancipation). The state 
represented control and rigidity, whereas civil society represented spontaneity and self-
organisation; the democratic transformation and the “coming civil society” which lie ahead 
(in time) could then only be effected by reviving society’s internal capacities and by rolling 
back the grip of the state to its “natural” limits.42 And secondly, civil society’s second 
“constitutive other” was what was presented as the passive majority of narod, whose “civic 
immaturity” (seen in their lack of protest and in “imprudent” voting choices) was seen as a 
threat to the democratic changes that the supporters of the opposition imagined. The 
euphoric, utopian intellectual consciousness which characterised the 1989–1990 civil society 
discourses gradually changed in the years that followed – the anti-communist political 
identities intensified further amid a gradual reshuffling of power relationships not only 
between political actors, but also among the intellectual elite. The restructuring of the power 
configuration in the latter’s field – that of knowledge production, dissemination, and 
interpretation – was particularly crucial in the subsequent re-conceptualisation of the idea of 
civil society itself, and is discussed next. 
 
Intellectuals Divided: The Traditional Intellectual Elite Versus the New “Experts” in 
the 1990–1997 Decommunisation Project 
Gramsci argued: 
Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential 
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, 
one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its 
own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields.43 
As a politically and externally initiated process,44 however, the collapse of the communist 
regime in Bulgaria lacked the visibility of a clear-cut economic or political stratum which 
was “coming into existence” and overthrowing the old system. It is therefore important that 
we take into account the relative chaos and vacuum occurring in numerous spheres of the 
political, economic,45 and cultural life of the country. The lack of an organised dissident 
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movement before 1989 also meant that there was no clear, already-formed cultural and 
political opposition – it was being born at the same time as the regime was collapsing, rather 
than before it.46 If we can conclude with hindsight that there were social groups, albeit not 
visible and homogenous, which were economically on the rise, there was not yet a clearly 
identified political and cultural elite (and more specifically, there were not yet organic 
intellectuals) who could mobilise the appeal of, and consent to, the changes – by organising 
the knowledge and imagination of and about the transition and thereby legitimise the specific 
direction of the changes. With the old political identities crumbling and new ones emerging, 
we could discern new fault lines surfacing. 
[...] 
The intellectuals’ (and more broadly, the “energetic minority’s”) victorious, and at the same 
time bifurcating, discourse during 1990 described in the previous section set the stage for a 
conceptualisation of civil society in terms of 1) an active minority (as against a passive 
majority) who pursue 2) truth (authenticity) and freedom (emancipation), which could only 
be achieved once 3) the communist state had been removed. In the years that followed, this 
conceptualisation largely gained hegemonic dominance, but the process was uneven and not 
without (sometimes intense) contestation. In the pages that follow, I review the major fault 
lines which marked these contestations and the resulting shifts in the conceptualisation of the 
civil society concept by 1997. 
With the 1989 breakdown of the official party control over the practices of public knowledge 
research, as well as over media, new discursive practices and orders of discourse – new 
practices (and agents) of production, dissemination, and consumption of public knowledge – 
emerged. Particularly interesting in terms of the conceptualisation of the idea of civil society 
are these shifts in relation to the intellectuals’ place and role in the new practices of 
knowledge production – traditionally in scientific research spaces (universities, research 
institutes) as well as in the new practices of knowledge-dissemination (media).47 A study 
carried out by Deyanova48 (2000) identified two “levels of presence” of the intellectuals in 
the public sphere during the 1990s – a “romantico-ideological” level embodied by “the 
engaged intellectual,” and an “expert talk” level embodied by the NGO (think-tank) expert. 
In 1999, Ivan Krastev, one of the most prolific Bulgarian liberal intellectuals, further 
described the newly-emerged think-tanks as hubs of principally engaged experts with strong 
media presence (and influence), which at the same time served as the “invisible hand of the 
transition” – skippering the assumed liberal (anti-Keynesian) direction of reforms.49 Drawing 
on their research of intellectuals’ public knowledge production/dissemination practices in 
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media, and utilising Krastev’s terminology, Deyanov50 and Deyanova51 further make a key 
analytical distinction between what they call “factories for data” (sociological agencies), 
“factories for arguments” (think-tanks) and “laboratories for knowledge” (academic research 
institutions, universities, and academies). Deyanov52 showed that the former two technologies 
worked together, as part of the expert hegemonic apparatus, producing normalised public 
opinion. They generated interpretations of society’s problems, formulated arguments, and 
designed agendas. With this, they ordered the public debate – setting priorities and selecting 
and interpreting the data on which public debates were to be based. That is, they were not just 
“factories” for the production of data and arguments but also “normalisation machines, 
technologies for the taming of public opinion.”53 From a Gramscian perspective, then, they 
worked as “organic intellectuals” – “permanent persuaders.”54 
Deyanova55 further identified an “odd” polarisation (or schism) between the research carried 
out by the former two, particularly think-tanks and NGOs, on one hand, and the latter, 
universities and academic workers, on the other. Her examination of their work in the period 
showed that these two “communities” ignored each other – they did not cite each other’s 
work and did not recognise each other’s legitimacy. The schism reflected the previously 
identified distinction (within their media presence) between “expert” and “romantico-
ideological” language, respectively. From a Gramscian perspective, then, we can roughly 
think of the former as representative of the “traditional intellectuals,” who present themselves 
as “autonomous and independent of the dominant social group,”56 but whose political 
identities and relationships crumbled and fragmented during the vacuum created by the 
precipitous changes. The new “expert” class, based in NGOs and think-tanks on the other 
hand, can be thought of as a much more homogenous and consistent group of “organic 
intellectuals” whose role was to organise the practical content of the new – liberal – 
hegemonic project of the democratic transformation, which they organised around neoliberal 
policy programmes and consistent emulation of the West as the “common sense” trajectory 
for post-socialist “reform.” As an oft-quoted remark (commonly attributed to Ferenc 
Misslivetz, a Hungarian academic and dissident57) goes, “What we dreamed of was civil 
society. What we got were NGOs.” 
Using Fairclough’s terminology then, these two “languages” (romantico-ideological and 
expert) are constitutive of the two main discourse “styles” of the 1990–1997 civil society 
discourse. The former “lived its moment” during the euphoric 1989–1990 resistance to the 
state; the latter developed with the appearance of a network of externally-funded non-
governmental organisations (foundations, charities, think-tanks) that flourished in the first six 
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to seven years of the “transition,” forming an entire “sector,” often referred to as “the Third 
Sector.” The emergence of the Third Sector marks a significant re-conceptualisation of the 
idea of civil society – from the early (in some ways Fergusonian58) diffuse utopian imaginary 
of an entirely new, civil, democratic, emancipated society, as embraced by the traditional 
intellectuals in 1989–90, to a (Tocquevillian59) self-organised, independent (from the state) 
and self-sufficient, expert-led (depoliticised) network of “associated citizens.” In this respect, 
the development of civil society in Bulgaria is consistent with similar developments in 
Central Europe, where analogous “NGO-isation” of civil society has been observed.60 Let us 
now turn to the contents of this new conception of civil society and the mechanisms through 
which it became hegemonic. 
As Lavergne61 notes, the new network of civil society organisations claimed the role of 
middle men in an “economy of expertise where they were the idea brokers and the 
importers/exporters of know-how.” They claimed the role of neutral experts who applied 
objective-scientific political and analytic tools that were effective and who produced 
“rational” prognoses beyond any moral (emotional/cultural) considerations. They claimed the 
image of the “rational experts” at the same time as they formulated arguments rooted in a 
particular value system with which they identified – a (neo)liberal one. In an in-depth 
analysis of their discourses, Lavergne62 showed that the think-tank experts asserted their 
“objective-independent” nature not through claims to a lack of a value-laden approach, or to 
the consideration of multiple scientific interpretations, but rather by way of grounding their 
claims in liberal democratic values which were considered to be “objectively” superior. The 
rhetoric of the expert-intellectuals rested on the traditional-modern dichotomy, presenting 
themselves as an enlightened, modernising force in contrast to the shadows of the communist 
past. Yet, the expert-intellectuals presented themselves as defenders of the “rights” of (the 
whole of) society against the encroachments of the state (which, they insisted, continued to 
pose the biggest threat). They did not present their ideas and activities as political but as 
universal – in an attempt to make them hegemonic. 
Once again, the overall legitimation strategy of the new (third) sector utilised precisely the 
idea of “civil society.” And it was essentially a double legitimation strategy. As Lavergne63 
also notes, the “NGO civil society” described previously presented themselves at the same 
time as both actors in and leaders of civil society. First, they were civil society leaders when 
they acted on behalf of the teleological paradigm of the transition, whereby civil society was 
to materialise in the form of a network of independent (from the state) and self-sufficient 
organisations (just like the transition was a ready-made package of economic and legal 
reforms64). The desired civil society here came with a concrete recipe for its development, 
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and its telos was at the same time situated temporally in the future and geographically to the 
West. In this first legitimating strategy, the NGO experts claimed the roles of 
“democratisers,” “modernisers,” and “decommunisers,” modelled after the normative ideal of 
the capitalist modern and open society as developed by Henri Bergson and Karl Popper.65 
[…] 
Overall, then, in the period 1990–1997 we can talk of (radically) changed subjectivities, 
power relationships, and discourses. The changing context of social structures, practices, and 
events looked like this: shifting political and cultural identities (non-communist and anti-
communist; and romantico-ideological and expert styles); shifting social relations of power 
and domination (in the political, but also in the intellectual field, where a new sector of NGOs 
and think-tanks replaced the more differentiated traditional intellectuals’ order of discourse); 
and of shifting constructions of systems of knowledge and meaning (from an “irrational” 
euphoric utopianism to the “rational” objectivity of the transitional democratic agenda). In 
this context of new structures and orders of discourse, the idea of civil society got caught up 
in the contestation between the early traditional dissident-intellectuals’ euphoric utopian 
anticipation of a radically new (and better) society, and the later intellectual-experts’ highly 
rationalised and prefabricated conceptualisation of civil society as a network of NGOs 
powerful enough to confront the state. Both the earlier and the later dominant 
conceptualisations articulated “civil society” as the antonym of authoritarianism, and thus 
positioned it against the state. Civil society was to limit the power of the state over all areas 
of social life, and with this, the new – liberal – articulation of civil society uncoupled the 
historical pairing of state and civil society. But any earlier rhetorical attempts to depoliticise 
the concept (seeking to articulate it as civic rather than political) had to be postponed as the 
civil public had to transform itself in the run-up to the “1997 revolution” into the political 
public – concerned with the form and content of power. The “civil” in “civil society” could 
not practically signify the non-political, as it needed to articulate a right to engage in a direct 
confrontation with the state (which was perceived as still captured by communists). In this 
way, the popular CEE mantra of the “liberation of civil society” from the suffocating grip of 
the state66 in Bulgaria came to refer to something more. It came to signify the need to liberate 
society from the grip of the ex-communists specifically, and to bring into power the 
opposition which by now had come to be identified as practically synonymous with civil 
society. In essence then, the struggle of the new intellectual-expert class to impose a 
“rational” democratic agenda involved first and foremost establishing the opposition – to 
them, the only legitimate social force to bring about genuine democratic changes67 – in 
power. 
It is also important to note that as much as the concept of civil society was politicised in 
practice (that is, it was used as a legitimating mechanism to induce political changes), 
rhetorically the attempts to articulate it as “outside of the left-right paradigm” persisted. In 
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fact, the latter strategy was particularly helpful in articulating civil society as substituting the 
“outdated” left-right political confrontation, and establishing a consensual vision of itself as 
encompassing the “truth” (earlier discourses) and the “rationality, objective superiority, and 
inevitability” (experts’ discourses) of the new liberal democratic project. If we think of 1989–
1997 as the first major period of the conceptualisation of civil society in Bulgaria, then we 
can think of “civil society” during this period as a nodal discourse, which attempted an 
ideological articulation of several other discourses and narratives, including: 1) “communist” 
state versus “free and honest citizens,” and 2) “free and honest citizens” (civil society) versus 
“unfree and passive popular subjects” (of the state); 3) “rational” experts promoting the 
democratic agenda versus irrational traditional intellectuals; and finally 4) a civil society 
space whose positioning beyond any left-right political identities grants it the legitimacy to 
engage in political struggle. These dichotomies were of course fraught with particularistic 
and undemocratic assumptions and distortions, and they carved out a host of unequal power 
relationships that were to persist and aggravate. 
These discourses and narratives taken together constituted the rising political and intellectual 
elites’ attempts during 1989–1997 to manufacture consent for the new liberal-capitalist 
ideology while exploiting utopian longings for truth, emancipation, and democratic 
participation. The role of the intellectuals was to both construct and enact this form of the 
idea of civil society. In this way, the utopian longing for freedom and truth provided the 
“gold-bearing gravel”68 of an ideological hegemonic apparatus that depoliticised the public 
sphere while pursuing a strictly political project, and demobilised vast sections of society by 
imposing a dominant language that masked and ignored their interests and problems by being 
completely indifferent to the notion of power. It was the urban middle class agenda – of the 
“active-energetic enlightened minority” – that was best secured by the invocation of such a 
notion of civil society; the agenda of the increasingly oppressed and marginalised small-town 
Bulgaria, what was degradingly renounced by expert-intellectuals as a “passive and docile 
majority of subjects,” was increasingly unrepresented by this notion. 
 
From the Utopian to the Pragmatic, or from Utopia to Ideology: The Neoliberalisation 
of Civil Society 
[…] 
We can thus recognise several ways in which utopian longings were exploited for ideological 
purposes during the period. These roughly correspond to three main tropes of the propagated 
version of civil society: civil society can provide an alternative to the state; the state 
constrains civil society’s entrepreneurial potentials; and civil society is an alternative to the 
formal sphere of party politics (that is, it is located beyond any left/right paradigms). It is safe 
to assume that people struggling against an authoritarian regime longed for a sphere of 
voluntary and purposive collective action, as well as for emancipation and self-determination. 
The imposed form of civil society that came to be taken as common sense, however, 
constructed a “free” subject (rather, “citizen”) who makes rational life choices and carries 
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responsibility for the consequences of these. In this way, as Lemke69 argues, citizens’ lives 
become a matter of entrepreneurship – they are wholly responsible for their wellbeing, which 
hinges on making the right choices and “investments” (of money, energy, and so on). The 
neoliberal form of civil society entailed the production of the moral subject as an 
entrepreneurial subject.70 Thus, the person longing for self-determination and emancipation 
(from the repressive state of the old regime) was interpellated as an entrepreneurial actor who 
is a rational, calculating subject, whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for 
“self-care.”71 This ideal neoliberal citizen is also atomised and pragmatic in choosing among 
different social, political, and economic options rather than mobilising collectively with 
others to transform these. 
The tendency to use the emotional appeal of civil society to promote neoliberal market policy 
prescriptions also resulted in the de-politicisation of the concept.72 Conveniently ignored 
were the power relations underpinning civil society and the exclusions resulting from these. 
The new civil society organisations further pushed out other forms of political agency, such 
as social movements and collective mass mobilisations.73 What is more, the regularly 
imposed division between “passive” and “active” (“narod” vs. “citizens”) served to cover up 
and mask (economic) social inequalities and issues of power and domination. The people 
who increasingly possessed less political, symbolic, and material power were finding 
themselves left out. The imposed model of civil society appeared to advance an elite agenda 
that placed the urban middle classes (dubbed an “active minority”) as its top priority instead. 
As I have shown previously, key to not just the manufacture of consent but also to the 
mobilisation of appeal to neoliberal ideology was the emotional appeal to autonomy and self-
determination inherent to the idea of civil society. The discourse of civil society was 
embedded in two main utopian discourses. The first was the discourse of “catching up,” 
which involved a dream of modernisation (which in the case of Bulgaria dates back to the 
period of the country’s national revival in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). In this 
context, calls to define the European West’s model of civil society (which in the 1990s had 
assumed a neoliberal form) as a universal model, and to mimic the “enlightened Europeans,” 
easily took root. The second ideologico-utopian discourse was the anti-communist discourse, 
which harboured dreams of retributive justice. One source of this fortunate fit between the 
neoliberal idea of civil society as an alternative to the state and as constitutive of the self-
interested and self-sustaining individual was the delegitimisation of communist state 
ideology. The civil society paradigm claimed excellent congruency with the dispositions that 
characterised the changed ideological environment. Thus, the transition in Bulgaria was a 
project of modernisation, resting on the claim that Bulgarian society had to enter the era of 
modern (Western) bourgeois civilisation. As part of this, it constituted a “civilizational 
choice”74 between tradition and modernity, past and future, Eastern and Western values. The 
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depth of the transformation aimed for was profound – it particularly targeted people’s 
worldviews and their “common sense.” However, consent to hegemony is never absolute.75 
What the post-2001 “populist wave” began to unravel was another wave of hegemonic 
struggle, whereby the idea of civil society as established between 1990 and 2001 was 
challenged and new re-articulations began to take place. 
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